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The	Ontological	(In)security	of	Similarity		
Wahhabism	versus	Islamism	in	Saudi	Foreign	Policy1	
	
May	Darwich	
Durham	University	
GIGA	German	Institute	of	Global	and	Area	Studies	
	
Abstract		
It	 has	 long	 been	 argued	 that	 identity	 matters	 in	 international	 relations.	 Yet,	 how	identity	impacts	enmity	and	conflict	among	states	remains	the	subject	of	debate.	The	existing	 literature	 asserts	 that	 differences	 in	 identity	 can	 be	 a	 source	 of	 conflict	whereas	 convergence	 and	 similarity	 lead	 to	 cooperation.	 Nevertheless,	 empirical	evidence	from	the	Middle	East	has	long	defied	this	hypothesis.	The	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia,	which	prides	itself	on	being	an	Islamic	model	and	claims	Islamic	leadership,	has	opposed	the	rise	to	power	of	Islamist	movements	in	the	Middle	East.	To	address	this	paradox,	this	article	builds	on	the	growing	literature	on	ontological	security	to	propose	a	theoretical	framework	explaining	how	similarity	can	generate	anxiety	and	identity	 risks.	 This	 framework,	 I	 argue,	moves	 beyond	 traditional	 regime	 security	approaches	 to	 reveal	 that	 security	 is	 not	 only	 physical	 but	 also	 ontological.	 I	 then	illustrate	the	argument	through	a	comparison	of	Saudi	identity	risks	in	the	wake	of	the	 Iranian	 revolution	 (1979)	 and	 the	 ascendance	 of	 the	 Muslim	 Brotherhood	 to	power	 in	 Egypt	 (2012).	 Ultimately,	 these	 cases	 provide	 intriguing	 insights	 into	foreign	policy	behaviour	during	critical	situations.	
	
Key	words:	ontological	security,	anxiety,	identity,	distinctiveness,	similarity	
	
Introduction	
It	has	long	been	argued	that	identity	matters	in	international	relations.	Yet,	how	identity	impact	 enmity	 and	 conflict	 among	 states	 remains	 an	 issue	 of	 debate.	 The	 existing	literature	 asserts	 that	 differences	 in	 identity	 and	 culture	 can	 be	 a	 source	 of	 conflict,	whereas	 convergence	 and	 similarity	 can	 lead	 to	 cooperation	 (Horowitz	 1995;	Huntington	 1993,	 1996).	 Likewise,	 thin	 constructivism	 in	 International	 Relations	 (IR)	
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posits	 that	 states	 will	 identify	 positively	 with	 those	 with	 a	 similar	 identity	 (Wendt	1999).	As	Haas	(2003,	36)	argues,	‘the	greater	the	ideological	similarities	among	states’	leaders,	 the	more	 likely	 they	will	 view	one	another’s	 interests	as	 complementary,	 and	thus	 the	 greater	 the	 incentives	 pushing	 these	 individuals	 to	 form	 an	 alliance’.	Nevertheless,	empirical	evidence	from	the	Middle	East	has	long	defied	this	hypothesis.	As	Walt	(1987,	170)	observes	in	his	study	of	alliances	in	the	region,	 ‘certain	ideologies	are	 more	 a	 source	 of	 division	 than	 of	 unity,	 even	 though	 the	 ideology	 explicitly	prescribes	close	cooperation	among	the	adherents’.	Pan-Islamism,	which	overtly	aims	to	overcome	 national	 territorial	 differences,	 has	 paradoxically	 been	 a	 source	 of	fragmentation	and	division.2		
This	 article	 extends	 upon,	 and	 goes	 beyond,	 the	 existing	 literature	 to	 argue	 that	similarities	 in	 identity	 can	 be	 a	 source	 of	 conflict	 and	 enmity.	 Largely	 based	 on	 the	adaptation	of	‘ontological	security’	to	IR	theory	(McSweeney	1999;	Mitzen	2006;	Steele	2005,	2008),	this	article	proposes	a	theoretical	framework	to	explain	how	similarity	can	generate	 anxiety.	 Building	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 have	 a	 basic	 need	 for	ontological	security,	which	refers	to	‘the	need	to	experience	oneself	as	a	whole’	(Mitzen	2006,	342),	I	argue	that	security	is	enforced	through	a	stable	conception	of	self-identity.	The	essence	of	such	a	conception	of	self-identity	is	the	distinctiveness	of	the	self	vis-à-vis	 the	 other.	 Accordingly,	 critical	 situations	 leading	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 such	distinctiveness	 trigger	anxiety	and	 insecurity,	as	regimes’	 identities	become	equivocal.	As	a	reactionary	imperative,	actors	attempt	to	restore	a	secure	self-identity	through	two	mechanisms:	counter-framing	the	other	in	a	demonizing	manner	and	reinventing	a	new	self–other	 distinction.	 This	 argument	 is	 illustrated	 through	 a	 close	 comparative	examination	of	Saudi	foreign	policy	in	1979	and	2012.	
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Despite	 its	 pan-Islamic	nature,	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 in	 Iran	was	perceived	 as	 a	threat	 to	 the	 Saudi	 Kingdom,	 a	 monarchy	 which	 itself	 asserted	 a	 broad	 pan-Islamic	identity.	 This	 anti-Iranian	 stance	 was	 often	 couched	 in	 sectarian	 terms,	 with	 the	Kingdom	 defining	 its	 identity	 as	 ‘Sunni’	 vis-à-vis	 a	 ‘Shiite’	 other.	 Following	 the	 2011	Arab	uprisings,	 the	 rise	of	 the	Muslim	Brotherhood	 (MB)	and	 its	political	offshoot	 the	Freedom	and	 Justice	Party	 in	Egypt	brought	up	several	uncertainties	within	 the	Saudi	royal	 elite,	who	could	not	hide	 their	 relief	 at	 the	Brotherhood’s	quick	downfall	 a	year	later.	The	Saudi	reactions	to	the	ascendance	of	this	Sunni	movement	to	power	in	Egypt	went	 beyond	 the	 conventional	 sectarian	 polarization	 in	 the	 region	 to	 reveal	 a	fundamental	 truth:	 the	 rise	 of	 any	 Islamic	 regime	 with	 a	 pan-Islamic	 vocation	 is	 a	considerable	 source	 of	 anxiety	 to	 the	 Kingdom.	 This	 article	 addresses	 the	 resulting	puzzle:	why	did	Saudi	Arabia,	a	monarchy	that	prides	itself	on	its	compliance	with	Islam,	controvert	the	specifications	of	the	proper	enactment	of	its	pan-Islamic	identity	instead	of	embracing	 its	principles?	Why	and	how	can	 identity	similarity	 foster	conflict	rather	than	inclusiveness	and	cooperation?	
Conventional	 explanations	 of	 Saudi	 foreign	 policy	 are	 divided	 between	instrumentalist	 approach	 to	 identity,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 sectarian	 accounts,	 on	 the	other	hand.	Based	on	an	adapted	realism	to	Third	World	countries,	scholars	argue	that	authoritarian	regimes	are	first	and	foremost	driven	by	a	quest	for	survival	(David	1991;	Mufti	1996;	Telhami	1999).	This	instrumentalist	approach	claims	that	regime	identities	are	seen	as	tools	in	the	hands	of	leaders	to	fend	off	domestic	or	external	threats	to	their	survival.	 Scholars	 then	 look	 at	 the	 material	 interests	 of	 actors	 in	 propping	 sectarian	divides,	 e.g.	 Sunni	 versus	 Shiite	 and	 Salafi-Wahhabi	 versus	 Muslim	 Brotherhood.	Sectarian	accounts,	on	 the	other	hand,	provided	a	primordial	account	based	on	Sunni-Shiite	 divide	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Iran	 or	 intra-Sunni	 divides	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 MB.	 These	
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primordial	accounts	analyse	these	identities	as	the	core	of	the	conflict	in	the	region	that	reaches	back	to	the	7th	century	and,	hence,	these	identities	continue	to	drive	the	politics	of	the	region	today.	Sectarianism	emerges	as	a	kind	of	 inevitable	conflict	between	two	clearly	 defined	 religious	 sects,	 much	 similar	 to	 the	 way	 ethnicity	 was	 analysed	 in	relations	to	the	conflicts	in	the	Balkans	in	the	1990s	(Abdo	2013;	e.g.	Nasr	2006).		
Whereas	 explanations	 of	 Saudi	 foreign	 policy	 tended	 to	 be	 trapped	 by	 either	instrumentalist	 or	 primordial	 approaches	 to	 identity,	 I	 argue	 here	 that	 ontological	security	 provides	 a	 fruitful	 third	 position.	 Looking	 at	 identity	 narratives	 through	 the	ontological	security	lens	provides	novel	interpretations	and	explanations	of	events,	for	which	material	explanations	failed	to	account.	Realist	falls	short	of	explaining	why	Saudi	Arabia	perceived	military	weakened	Iran	as	a	threat	in	1979.	Also,	why	Egypt	of	the	MB,	suffering	domestic	turmoil	and	economic	hardship,	was	source	of	fear	to	the	Kingdom	is	another	 challenge	 to	 materialist	 explanations.	 This	 article	 largely	 moves	 beyond	 the	existing	literature	to	argue	that	the	Kingdom	not	only	feels	that	its	physical	security	is	threatened	 but	 identity	 risks	 could	 be	 the	 drive	 behind	 some	 foreign	 policy	 choices.	Moreover,	 an	 ontological	 security	 lens	 provides	 insights	 to	 understand	 the	 policy	implications	of	 identity	narrowing.	 In	 the	process	of	 forcing	 the	Saudi	uniqueness	and	distinctiveness,	 and	 restoring	 ontological	 security,	 the	 redefined	 regime	 identity	ironically	became	a	handicap	for	Riyadh’s	regional	ambitions.	A	Salafi-Wahhabi	identity,	an	 inherently	 exclusionary	 narrative,	 lacks	 the	 necessary	 openness	 and	 the	 collective	vision	to	support	the	role	of	a	potential	leader	in	the	region	(Richter	2014,	185–186).	
Based	 on	 an	 ontological	 security	 interpretation,	 this	 article	 attempts	 to	 explain	how	the	Islamic	revolution	in	Iran	and	the	rise	of	the	MB	in	Egypt	developed	into	a	risk	for	the	Saudi	regime’s	identity.	By	comparing	the	Saudi	foreign	policy	discourse	towards	
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Iran	 in	 1979	 with	 that	 towards	 the	 MB	 in	 2012,	 I	 argue	 that	 in	 both	 cases	 the	 self-identity	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 was	 threatened	 as	 its	 source	 of	 distinctiveness	 was	 eroded.	Consequently,	the	Kingdom	responded	with	the	two	mechanisms	noted	above	to	restore	its	 identity	 security.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 in	 Iran,	 Saudi	 Arabia	streamlined	 its	own	 identity	 from	 that	of	 a	 champion	of	 the	pan-Islamist	discourse	 to	being	the	leader	of	the	Sunni	world.	In	the	case	of	the	MB,	the	Kingdom	further	reduced	its	identity	to	portray	itself	as	upholding	a	Salafi	Wahhabi	narrative,	an	offshoot	of	the	Sunni	 tradition.	 The	 correlations	 between	 these	 critical	 situations	 and	 Saudi	 identity	narrowing	 confirm	 this	 article’s	 hypothesis:	 identity	 similarity	 causes	 anxiety	 and	ontological	insecurity.	
To	 explicate	 this	 argument,	 the	 article	 proceeds	 as	 follows:	 First,	 I	 examine	 the	concept	of	ontological	security	and	develop	a	theoretical	framework	to	explain	why,	and	the	 conditions	 under	 which,	 similarity	 generates	 anxiety	 and	 insecurity.	 Second,	 I	examine	the	case	of	the	Iranian	revolution	and	the	threat	it	posed	to	the	Saudi	regime,	and	 how	 the	 regime	 reduced	 its	 identity	 and	 reacted	 with	 a	 Sunni-versus-Shiite	discourse.	Third,	I	discuss	the	Saudi	reaction	to	the	rise	of	the	MB	in	Egypt	and	how	the	Kingdom	narrowed	its	identity	to	Salafi-Wahhabism	to	face	this	challenge.	
1. ONTOLOGICAL	(IN)SECURITY:	A	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	
The	 emphasis	 on	 cultural	 and	 ideational	 factors	 as	 determinants	 of	 conflict	 and	cooperation	among	states	has	emerged	as	a	major	trend	in	IR	theory	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	 War.	 Huntington’s	 (1993)	 famous	 argument	 about	 the	 clash	 of	 civilizations	postulates	that	conflicts	would	erupt	around	cultural	divides.	He	clearly	claims	that	 ‘in	this	new	world	order	(…)	the	most	persuasive,	 important,	and	dangerous	conflicts	(…)	will	 (…)	be	between	peoples	belonging	 to	different	 cultural	 entities’	 (1996,	28).	 Some	
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scholars	 not	 only	 drew	 correlations	 between	 identity	 difference	 and	 enmity	 but	 also	considered	difference	 to	 be	 a	major	 driver	 of	 conflict.	Horowitz	 (1995)	 contends	 that	group	differences,	highlighted	by	the	lack	of	common	identity	denominators,	are	a	factor	in	ethnic	conflicts.	Saideman	(2001)	suggests	that	states	get	 involved	in	ethnic	conflict	based	on	identity	affinities;	they	intervene	to	support	the	side	of	the	conflict	with	which	their	 constituents	 share	 an	 ethnicity.	 Also,	 social	 constructivists	 in	 IR	 asserted	 that	 a	sense	of	 shared	 identity	 eliminates	 the	perception	of	 threat,	which	 is	 in	 turn	 likely	 to	increase	the	probability	of	interstate	cooperation	(Hopf	2002;	Wendt	1999).	
Only	few	scholars	opposed	this	trend,	claiming	that	shared	ties	can	be	the	most	decisive	 in	 generating	 conflict	 and	 enmity.	 Axelrod	 (1997)	 suggests	 that	 convergence	among	individuals	or	groups	can	lead	to	division	and	divergence.	The	factors	that	create	common	 identities—such	 as	 pan-Arabism,	 pan-Islamism,	 or	 a	 European	 identity—can	lead	to	an	increased	perception	of	difference.	Based	on	a	quantitative	analysis,	Gartzke	and	Gleditsch	(2006)	also	find	that	conflict	is	more	likely	among	culturally	similar	states	than	 among	 culturally	 dissimilar	 ones.3	Although	 these	 few	 attempts	 cast	 doubt	 on	identity	 similarity	 as	 a	 source	 of	 cooperation	 only,	 our	 knowledge	 of	 why	 and	 how	identity	 similarity	 can	be	 a	 source	of	 conflict	 among	 states	 remains	very	 limited.	This	section	thus	develops	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	ontological	security	to	address	this	gap.	
Why	does	similarity	threaten	actors?	Why	do	states	need	to	assert	a	distinctive	self-identity?	The	answer,	I	argue,	lies	in	the	intricate	ontological-security	need	of	states	to	 have	 a	 distinctive	 and	 consistent	 sense	 of	 self	 and	 to	 have	 that	 sense	 affirmed	 by	others.	 Some	 IR	 scholars	 have	 aimed	 to	 transfer	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘ontological	 security’,	coined	by	the	psychiatrist	R.D.	Laing,	from	the	individual	to	the	state	level.4	For	Laing,	an	
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ontologically	 secure	 individual	 is	 one	 with	 a	 firm	 ‘sense	 of	 integral	 selfhood	 and	personal	identity’.	The	concept	was	further	developed	in	Giddens’	structuration	theory	(1984,	1991).	He	defines	ontological	security	as	‘the	confidence	that	most	human	beings	have	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	 their	 self-identity	 and	 in	 the	 constancy	 of	 the	 surrounding	social	and	material	environments	of	action’	(1991,	92).	Such	a	sense	of	self	is	reflected	in	agents’	behaviour.	As	Mitzen	(2006,	344)	argues,	‘ontological	security	is	security	not	of	the	body	but	of	the	self,	the	subjective	sense	of	who	one	is,	which	enables	and	motivates	action	 and	 choice’.	 In	 other	words,	 agents	 choose	 a	 course	 of	 action	 that	 conforms	 to	their	self-identity.		
Accordingly,	and	in	contrast	to	realist	accounts,	where	security	and	survival	are	achieved	 through	 the	 accumulation	 of	 military	 capabilities,	 actors	 also	 engage	 in	ontological	 security–seeking	 behaviour	 to	 affirm	 their	 self-identity,	 which	 provides	them	 with	 ‘a	 sense	 of	 continuity	 and	 order	 in	 events’	 (Giddens	 1991,	 243).	 Hence,	ontological	security	involves	the	ability	to	‘experience	oneself	as	a	whole	(…)	in	order	to	realize	a	sense	of	agency’	 (Mitzen	2006,	342).	 In	other	words,	 individuals	need	 to	 feel	secure	in	who	they	are,	as	they	see	themselves	and	as	they	want	to	be	seen	by	others.	As	Giddens	 claims,	 ‘to	 be	 ontologically	 secure	 is	 to	 possess	 (...)	 answers	 to	 fundamental	existential	questions	which	all	human	life	 in	some	way	addresses’	(Giddens	1991,	47).	This	claim	suggests	that	‘insecurity’	means	that	individuals	are	confused	about	who	they	are	 and	 uncomfortable	 with	 their	 identity	 in	 social	 interactions	 with	 others	 (Steele	2005,	525).	
But	how	do	states	acquire	this	sense	of	self?	The	sources	of	ontological	security	are	the	subject	of	contention	among	scholars.	On	the	one	hand,	Steele	(2008)	argues	that	ontological	security	 is	couched	 in	a	state’s	 intrinsic	narrative	about	 the	self.	From	this	
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perspective,	 this	 sense	 of	 self	 enables	 the	 state	 to	 process	 its	 environment	 and	 build	sustainable	relationships	with	others.	However,	other	scholars	argue	that	a	state’s	sense	of	 self	 is	 based	 on	 social	 interaction	 with	 others.	 As	 Mitzen	 (2006,	 354)	 argues,	 the	state’s	 identity	 is	 ‘constituted	 and	 sustained	 by	 social	 relationships	 rather	 than	 being	intrinsic’.	 In	 this	regard,	 the	sense	of	self	 is	only	reinforced	and	distinguished	through	sustainable	interactions	with	others.		
Drawing	 on	 this	 contentious	 debate,	 Zarakol	 (2010,	 19)	 has	 sought	 a	 middle	ground	 but	 arguing	 that	 both	 are	 ‘partly	 right’.	 As	 Kinvall	 states	 (2004,	 749),	‘internalized	 self-notions	 can	 never	 be	 separated	 from	 self/other	 representations	 and	are	always	responsive	to	new	inter-personal	relationships’.	 I,	 therefore,	argue	that	 the	exogenous	and	endogenous	sources	of	ontological	security	are	inextricably	interrelated.	As	identity	refers	to	‘the	image	of	individuality	and	distinctiveness	(selfhood)	held	and	projected	by	an	actor’	 (Jepperson,	Wendt,	and	Katzenstein	1996,	95),	 the	sense	of	self	acquires	meaning	not	only	 through	the	actor’s	distinctive	personal	characters	but	also	through	the	uniqueness	of	this	narrative	from	the	other.	On	the	one	hand,	self-identity	is	affirmed	 at	 the	 self-versus-other	 nexus.	 In	 other	 words,	 distinctiveness	 ‘can	 only	 be	established	 by	 difference,	 by	 drawing	 a	 line	 between	 something	 and	 something	 else’	(Nabers	2009,	195).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 self-identity	 and	 its	 narrative	 do	 not	 originate	 in	 the	interaction	 with	 others.	 Actors	 extract	 their	 self-identity	 from	 their	 own	 characters.	Taking	 the	example	of	 Saudi	Arabia,	 as	will	 be	demonstrated	 in	 the	empirical	 section,	identity	 was	 framed	 and	 reframed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 interaction	 with	 similar	 others.	Nevertheless,	 the	 new	 definition	 of	 the	 self	 emerged	 from	 a	 ‘menu	 of	 identities’	embedded	 in	 the	 Kingdom’s	 reflexive	 understanding	 of	 the	 self.	 In	 sum,	 ontological	
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security	emerges	from	that	nexus	of	actor’s	understanding	of	the	self	and	the	interaction	with	others.	
To	 demonstrate	 this	 argument,	 I	 develop	 a	 theoretical	 framework,	 which	explicates	how	this	need	for	distinctiveness	renders	similar	identities	threatening.	The	approach	to	study	ontological	security	is	often	characterized	as	‘interpretivist’	driven	by	understanding	 the	 intersubjective	 understanding	 of	 social	 actions	 as	 opposed	 to	‘positivism’	relying	on	causality	 in	explaining	actor’s	behaviour	(e.g.	Steele	2008,	6–7).	This	 interpretivist	approach	evaluates	the	context	 in	which	self-identity	narratives	are	created	 and	 the	 internal	 dialectic	 of	 the	 Self	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 Other.	 In	 the	 below	theoretical	 framework,	 I	 here	 argue	 that	 combining	 an	 interpretivist	 approach	with	 a	positivist	 one	 allows	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 dynamics	 underlying	 the	all-embracing	need	for	ontological	security.5	Arguing	that	state	identity	is	not	only	self-reflexive	 but	 also	 relational	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 a	 causal	 analysis.	 Accordingly,	 the	structure,	within	which	actors	interact,	exists	beyond	actor’s	understanding.	Therefore,	I	argue	here	that	causal	mechanisms	are	needed	to	unravel	the	influence	of	the	structure	and	 the	 interaction	 with	 others	 in	 this	 process	 of	 ontological	 security	 and	 identity	framing.		
Identity	 distinctiveness,	 though	 connected	 to	 the	 self–other	 relationship,	becomes	 integral	 to	 the	 actor’s	 self-identity	 and	 the	 maintenance	 of	 a	 consistent	narrative	contributes	to	the	actor’s	ontological	security.	 	 If	continuity	and	order	 in	the	self-versus-other	 relationships	 are	 the	 main	 source	 of	 ontological	 security,	 ‘critical	situations’	that	disrupt	actor’s	distinctiveness	can	pose	risks	to	the	sense	of	self.	Giddens	(1984,	 61)	 defines	 ‘critical	 situations’	 as	 ‘circumstances	 of	 a	 radical	 disjuncture	 of	 an	unpredictable	 kind	 which	 affect	 substantial	 numbers	 of	 individuals’.	 These	
10		
unpredictable	situations	constitute	an	identity	threat,	as	‘agents	perceive	that	something	can	 be	 done	 to	 eliminate	 them’	 (Steele	 2008,	 12).	 Giddens’	 structuration	 theory	presented	 these	 critical	 situations	 as	 endogenous	 to	 the	 self-identity.	 In	 other	words,	they	are	situations	constituted	by	the	fragilities	of	entities;	only	actors	who	care	about	ontological	 security	will	perceive	 these	 critical	 situations	as	 such.	Acknowledging	 that	self-identity	 is	 the	 product	 of	 interaction	 with	 others	 alongside	 the	 reflexive	understanding	 of	 the	 Self,	 my	 conception	 of	 ‘critical	 situations’	 goes	 beyond	 the	endogenous	sources	of	ontological	security.		
If	the	constitution	of	the	Self	is	related	to	the	other,	‘critical	situations’	can	also	be	external	events	that	alter	the	representation	of	the	Other,	which	ultimately	constitutes	a	source	 of	 instability	 and	 insecurity	 for	 the	 self.	 These	 events	 can	 include	 revolutions,	wars,	 and	 regime	 changes.	 When	 critical	 situations	 alter	 the	 established	 Self-Other	distinction,	agents	uncomfortable	 in	who	 they	are.	This	 constant	effort	 to	 forge	a	 self-distinctiveness	can	be	seen	as	part	of	a	larger	process	in	the	state	system,	that	is	actor’s	‘struggle	 for	 recognition’.6	States	 not	 only	 frame	 their	 self-other	 distinction	 but	 also	desire	 to	 have	 their	 particular	 narrative	 recognized	 by	 their	 interlocutors	 in	 the	international	 system.	 As	Wendt	 (2003,	 559)	 argues:	 ‘it	 is	 through	 recognition	 by	 the	Other	 that	 one	 is	 constituted	 as	 a	 Self	 in	 the	 first	 place’.	 Therefore,	 acquiring	ontological	 security	 entails	 reproducing	 a	 particular	 self-versus-other	distinctiveness	and	having	this	narrative	recognized	by	others.	Therefore,	critical	situations	 evolve	 as	 the	 actor’s	 distinctiveness	 is	 disrupted	 and	 it	 is	 not	recognized	by	the	Other.		
As	the	very	basis	of	identity	construction	is	differentiation	and	uniqueness	from	others,	any	disturbance	in	the	self-versus-other	distinction	leads	to	agents’	uncertainty	
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about	 their	 own	 identity.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 conventional	wisdom	 that	 similar	 identities	 lead	 to	 convergence	 and	 cooperation,	 cultural	 and	identity	 similarities	 can	 lead	 to	 differentiation	 and	 conflict.	 Based	 on	 social	 identity	theory,	 Brewer	 (1991)	 postulates	 that	 the	 need	 for	 distinctiveness	 is	 met	 through	comparisons.	 Consequently,	 similarity	 constitutes	 a	 threat	 to	 one’s	 need	 for	differentiation	or	distinctiveness.	As	Currie	(2004,	86)	notes,	‘one’s	individuality	is	more	threatened	 by	 similarity	 rather	 than	 difference’.	 Therefore,	 similarity	 is	 a	 source	 of	disturbance	 because	 the	 old	 and	 secure	 meaning	 of	 self	 and	 the	 associated	 sense	 of	agency	become	irrelevant.		
But	what	does	 ‘identity	 similarity’	mean?	And	 is	 similarity	 always	 threatening?	Absolute	similarity,	that	is	sameness,	is	implausible.	Therefore,	by	similarity	I	mean	that	actors	 share	 common	 beliefs.	 Social	 psychology	 literature	 highlighted	 the	 process	 of	developing	 larger	 collective	 identities	 between	 groups	 as	 an	 effective	 technique	 of	reducing	 conflicts.	 The	 Common	 Ingroup	 Identity	 Model	 (CIIM)	 advocates	 the	elimination	of	group	boundaries	by	 facilitating	 the	 inclusion	of	different	groups	 into	a	‘superordinate	 identity’	 (Gaertner	 et	 al.	 1993,	 2000).	 Applications	 of	 this	 model	conclude	 that	 sharing	 a	 common	 identity	 can	 reduce	 the	perception	of	 the	Other	 as	 a	threat	 (Prentice	 and	Miller	 1999;	 Rousseau	 and	 Rocio	 2007).	 Despite	 the	 supportive	literature	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 superordinate	 identities	 can	 reduce	 conflict	 among	 groups,	some	work	within	social	identity	theory	postulate	that	low	levels	of	similarity	can	foster	cooperation	 whereas	 high	 levels	 of	 similarity	 can	 lead	 to	 the	 opposite	 (Snyder	 and	Fromkin	1980).	Freud	(1917,	197)	argues	that	individuals	hold	aggression,	hatred,	and	envy	toward	those	who	resemble	them	the	most.	Individuals	feel	threatened	not	by	the	‘Other’	with	who	 they	have	 little	 in	common	–	 the	 ‘nearly-we’,	who	mirror	and	reflect	
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them.	 Brewer’s	 (1991)	 theory	 of	 ‘Optimal	 Distinctiveness’	 posits	 that	 actors	simultaneously	express	a	need	for	both	assimilation	and	differentiation.	Actors	become	satisfied	 and	 secure	 when	 they	 adopt	 a	 level	 of	 social	 identity	 that	 lies	 somewhere	between	the	uniqueness	of	his	own	self-identity	and	 larger	collective	 identities.	At	 the	extremes,	 actor’s	 identity	 is	 threatened.	 Being	 highly	 individualized	 leads	 to	 actor’s	isolation	 and	 stigmatization.	 At	 the	 other	 extreme,	 being	 totally	 included	 in	 a	 larger	collective	 identity	 eliminates	 the	 actor’s	 self-identity,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 comparison	with	 others	 (Brewer	 1991,	 477–478).	 Consequently,	 actors	 are	 motivated	 to	 find	 an	optimal	 balance	 between	 assimilation	with	 and	differentiation	 from	others.	 From	 this	perspective,	similarity	could	be	threatening	if	states’	assimilation	becomes	much	higher	than	 its	 differentiation	 from	others.	 Similarity,	 I	 argue	here,	 becomes	 threatening	 if	 it	extends	to	that	particular	line	of	distinctiveness	without	which	the	actor’s	raison	d’être	is	meaningless.	
Consequently,	 the	 lack	 of	 distinctiveness	 will	 trigger	 anxiety,	 which	 Giddens	(1991,	 43)	 defines	 ‘a	 generalized	 state	 of	 emotions’.	When	 the	 agent’s	 self-identity	 is	challenged,	anxiety	causes	a	state	of	ontological	insecurity	that	is	not	based	on	a	specific	objectified	threat	as	it	attacks	the	‘core	of	the	self	once	a	basic	security	system	is	set	up’	(Giddens	1991,	44).	But	what	 is	 the	worst	scenario	of	a	case	of	ontological	 insecurity?	Can	 it	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 elimination	 of	 actors	 as	 physical	 security	 does?	 The	ontological	 security	 literature	 stresses	 that	 ontological	 and	 physical	 security	 are	distinct,	 as	 they	 are	 characterized	 by	 different	 dynamics	 and	 process.	 Although	 both	types	of	insecurities	are	inherently	separate,	I	argue	that	both	are	interrelated	and	affect	one	another.	As	Rumelili	(2015,	60)	states:	 ‘concerns	about	 instability	and	uncertainty	of	 being	 can	 easily	 be	 politically	 mobilized	 and	 manipulated	 into	 concerns	 about	
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survival’.	Also,	if	statesmen	fail	to	maintain	a	consistent	narrative	about	the	state’s	self-identity	 and	 its	 raison	d’être,	 domestic	 rifts	 can	 ensue.	 Because	 the	 endogenous	 and	exogenous	 sources	of	 identity	become	 inextricably	 related	 in	 the	 state	narrative,	 such	challenges	 can	 pose	 an	 existential	 threat	 to	 the	 state,	 jeopardizing	 its	 survival	 as	 a	collective	 community	 of	 several	 societal	 groups.	 In	 short,	 challenges	 to	 states’	distinctiveness	and	uniqueness	vis-à-vis	the	Other	can	lead	to	physical	threats.		
When	 critical	 situations	 create	 identity	 similarity,	 actors	 adopt	 an	 imperative	reactionary	behaviour	to	restore	clear	waters	between	them	and	the	other,	what	Freud	(1917,	197)	referred	 to	as	 ‘the	narcissism	of	minor	differences’.	Two	general	adaptive	strategies	can	be	discerned.	Firstly,	actors	tend	to	frame	the	other	in	a	demonizing	way	to	legitimize	their	own	identity.	As	illustrated	in	the	following	sections,	Saudi	Arabia	has	tended	 to	 frame	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 in	 Iran	 and	 the	MB	 in	 Egypt	 as	 unfaithful	 and	deviating	from	the	true	path	of	Islam.	Secondly,	actors	are	likely	to	bolster	the	old	self–other	 distinction	 and	 seek	 to	 generate	 a	 new	 and	 secure	 identity.	 Actors	 reinvent	relationships	with	others	by	fostering	new	differences	and	distinctions	in	the	discourse	of	 their	 identity	 (Bloom	 1990,	 39–40).	 The	 Saudis	 thus	 reinvented	 their	 self-identity,	moving	 from	pan-Islamism	 to	 Sunni	 Islam,	 to	 highlight	 a	 new	distinction	 vis-à-vis	 the	Iranian	 revolution—that	 is,	 Sunni	 versus	 Shiite.	With	 the	MB’s	 ascendance,	 the	 Saudi	Kingdom	 further	 streamlined	 its	 identity,	moving	 from	a	broadly	 Sunni	narrative	 to	 a	narrow	 Salafi-Wahhabi	 discourse—an	 offshoot	 of	 the	 Sunni	 tradition—and,	 thereby,	excluding	the	MB	and	any	other	Sunni	group.		
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Figure	1:	Restoring	ontological	security	
	
The	remainder	of	 this	article	uses	 the	case	of	Saudi	 foreign	policy	 to	 illustrate	 this	theoretical	framework.	By	demonstrating	the	correlation	between	the	critical	situations	of	1979	and	2012	and	Saudi	mechanisms	of	restoring	ontological	security:	demonizing	the	 Other	 and	 identity	 narrowing,	 this	 article’s	 hypothesis	 of	 anxiety	 and	 ontological	
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security	as	the	drive	behind	Saudi	foreign	policy	behaviour	is	rendered	plausible.	With	the	 rise	 of	 Islamist	 movements	 to	 power,	 the	 Saudi	 regime	 feared	 the	 erosion	 of	 its	identity.	The	following	two	sections	explore	Saudi	foreign	behaviour	toward	the	Iranian	revolution	in	1979	and	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	in	2012.	Such	an	empirical	comparison,	I	 argue,	 offers	 an	 extremely	 useful	 opportunity	 to	 illustrate	 the	 above	 theoretical	framework.	This	correlation	in	the	case	studies	illustrates	the	preliminary	validity	of	the	main	hypothesis:	identity	similarity	can	be	a	source	of	anxiety	and	ontological	insecurity	In	addition,	they	shed	light	on	the	relevance	of	the	theoretical	proposition	and	probe	its	plausibility	 for	 theory	building.7	As	 these	 cases	benefit	 the	process	of	 theory	building,	this	 theoretical	 framework	provides	a	novel	 lens	 to	enhance	our	understanding	of	 the	cases	through	unpacking	the	manifestations	of	anxiety	in	foreign	policy	behaviour.	
2. AN	ONTOLOGICAL	SECURITY	INTERPRETATION	OF	SAUDI	FOREIGN	
POLICY	
Before	examining	the	Saudi	Kingdom’s	behaviour,	I	will	briefly	explore	what	‘Saudi	state	identity’	 means.	 As	 opposed	 to	 Arab	 states,	 where	 nationalism	 was	 based	 on	 ethnic	elements,	 such	 as	Arabism,	 combined	with	 territorial	 affinities	 related	 to	 the	 struggle	against	 colonialism,	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Saudi	 Arabia	 was	 not	 formed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	‘national’	identity.	Modern	Saudi	Arabia	came	into	existence	as	a	result	of	the	Al	Saud’s	attempt	 to	establish	an	 Islamic	monarchy	on	the	Arabian	Peninsula.	The	unification	of	the	 Arabian	 Peninsula	 was	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 long-standing	 alliance	 between	Muhammed	Ibn	‘Abd	al-Wahhab	(the	eponym	of	Wahhabism)	and	the	Al	Saud.8		The	new	state	lacked	a	national	identity	that	could	stand	in	contrast	to	the	patriotism	developing	in	the	neighbouring	Arab	states.9	The	Saudi	state	identity	thus	came	to	be	based	on	an	appropriation	of	 Islamic	symbols:	 ‘our	constitution	is	the	Quran	and	the	application	of	
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shari’a’.	 Islam,	 and	 its	 Wahhabi	 interpretation	 in	 particular,	 enabled	 the	 regime	 to	distinguish	 itself	 from	other	 regional	 actors.10	As	Nevo	 (1998,	 35)	 states,	 ‘religion	has	played	 a	 prominent	 role	 not	 only	 in	 moulding	 the	 individual’s	 private	 and	 collective	identities	but	also	in	consolidating	[the]	national	values’.11		
Since	 Saudi	 Arabia	 has	 two	 of	 the	 three	 holy	 cities	 of	 Islam	 within	 its	 borders—Mecca	and	Medina—Islam	served	as	a	source	of	its	distinctiveness	from	other	states	in	the	region.	For	decades,	the	Kingdom	relied	on	Islam	to	provide	it	with	a	unique	identity	in	the	region,	separate	from	the	secular	pan-Arab	wave	that	swept	the	region	during	the	1950s	 and	 1960s	 under	 the	 charismatic	 leadership	 of	 Egyptian	 President	 Nasser	(Piscatori	1983).	In	an	attempt	to	discredit	pan-Arabism,	the	Kingdom	emphasized	the	imagery	 of	 the	 pan-Islamic	 umma12	and	 crowned	 itself	 the	 defender	 of	 faith	 in	 the	region.	 In	 other	 words,	 pan-Islamism,	 which	 prescribed	 solidarity	 among	 Muslims,	emerged	 as	 a	 superordinate	 identity	 that	 gathers	 different	 people	 in	 different	 states	under	the	banner	of	Islam.	This	pan-Islamic	narrative	was	often	identified	by	King	Faisal	(1964–1975)	 as	 the	 inherent	 raison	 d’être	 of	 the	 Saudi	 state	 (Sindi	 1986).	 With	 the	demise	of	the	pan-Arab	project,13	Saudi	Arabia	portrayed	itself	as	the	representative	of	the	Muslim	world	and	prided	itself	on	being	the	only	Islamic	state	to	rule	according	to	shari’a.		
Ironically,	its	claim	to	be	the	protagonist	of	‘true’	Islam	in	the	world	sowed	the	seeds	of	 the	 Saudi	 state’s	 ultimate	 vulnerability	 to	 other	 emerging	 Islamic	 models	 in	 the	region.	 Despite	 the	 presence	 of	 pan-Islamism	 as	 a	 superordinate	 identity,	 which	prescribes	 that	 all	 Muslims	 are	 one	 people,	 any	 possibility	 of	 a	 neighbouring	 state	adopting	 an	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	 similar	 to	 the	 Saudi	 version	 constituted	 a	 critical	threat	to	the	state’s	uniqueness	and	distinctiveness.	In	1979,	the	Kingdom	feared	that	it	
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would	lose	its	unique	Islamic	credentials	when	the	Islamic	revolution	in	Iran	adopted	a	pan-Islamic	 identity	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Saudis.	 Pan-Islamism	 as	 a	 distinction	according	to	which	the	kingdom	had	consolidated	its	identity	vis-à-vis	the	other	states	in	the	region	became	irrelevant.	Seeking	to	re-establish	 its	uniqueness,	 the	Saudi	state	narrowed	 its	 regime	 identity	 from	 pan-Islamism	 to	 Sunni	 Islam.	 Based	 on	 this	 Sunni	version	of	Islam,	Iran	became	a	Shiite	‘other’.		
Decades	 later,	 the	 ascendance	 of	 the	 MB	 to	 power	 in	 Egypt	 in	 2012	 constituted	another	 acute	 challenge.	 The	 Kingdom	 had	 been	 successful	 in	 re-establishing	 its	distinctiveness	 following	 the	 Iranian	 revolution	by	making	 a	 sectarian	distinction,	 but	the	MB	belonged	to	the	Sunni	interpretation	of	Islam.	To	adapt	to	this	new	situation,	the	Kingdom	 thus	 adopted	 a	 narrow	 Salafi-Wahhabi	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	 vis-à-vis	 the	MB’s	 Islamic	Sunni	discourse.	An	ontological	 security	 lens	allows	 the	 interpretation	of	this	process	of	identity	narrowing	as	driven	by	anxiety.	 	
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Figure	2:	The	Saudi	Identity	Reframing	Process		
	
A- The	Islamic	Revolution	and	the	Security	of	Sectarianism	
While	the	ideal	of	Islamic	unity	and	solidarity	is	encapsulated	in	the	Quranic	notion	of	
umma,	 pan-Islamism	 became	 an	 integral	 component	 of	 Saudi	 regime	 identity	 and	foreign	 policy	 in	 only	 the	 1960s	 and	 the	 1970s	 (Al-Yassini	 1987).	 Saudi	 Arabia	portrayed	 itself	 as	 the	 leader	 speaking	 in	 the	 name	of	 Islam.	This	 narrative	was	 even	recognized	by	 the	 Iranian	Other.	Whereas	 the	Saudis	embraced	a	pan-Islamic	 identity,	the	 shah	 opted	 to	 construct	 an	 identity	 for	 the	 Iranian	 state	 that	 appealed	 to	 Iranian	nationalism	 adoptive	 of	 liberal	 Western	 values	 (Adib-Moghaddam	 2006,	 13–16).	Recognizing	Saudi	Arabia’s	pan-Islamic	identity,	the	shah	wrote:	
I	 had	 traveled	 on	 several	 occasions	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 a	 country	 whose	 integrity	 and	independence	 are	 sacred	 for	 all	Muslims	 (...)	As	 a	 faithful	Muslim	and	Defender	of	 the	Faith,	 I	 hope	 that	 Saudi	 Arabia	 will	 always	 remain	 the	 guardian	 of	 [the]	 holy	 places,	
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Mecca	 and	 Medina,	 where	 millions	 of	 pilgrims	 travel	 every	 year	 on	 the	 path	 to	 God.	(Pahlavi	1982,	134)14	Pan-Islamism	 became	 a	 Saudi	 foreign	 policy	 doctrine	 under	 King	 Faisal.	 To	promote	 this	 identity	 narrative,	 King	 Faisal	 established	 a	 number	 of	 national	 and	supranational	 institutions	 (Hegghammer	 2010,	 17–18),	 which	 worked	 to	 promote	cooperation	and	solidarity	 in	 the	Muslim	world,	especially	 in	providing	support	 to	 the	Palestinians	 (Ochsenwald	 1981,	 276).	 In	 this	 framework,	 King	 Faisal	 established	 the	Organization	 of	 Islamic	 Conference	 (OIC)	 between	 1969	 and	 1972	 and	 the	 Muslim	World	League	(MWL)	 in	1962.	These	diplomatic	endeavours	allowed	the	Kingdom	the	recognition	 from	other	Arabs	and	non-Arabs	of	 its	status	as	 the	 leader	of	 the	Muslims	world.	
When	 Saudi	 Arabia	 had	 consolidated	 its	 distinct	 identity	 as	 the	 sole	 Islamic	model	 in	 the	 region,	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 broke	 out	 in	 Iran	 in	 1979,	 thereby	undermining	 the	Saudi’s	 self-identity	by	altering	 the	representation	of	 the	 ‘other’.	The	Islamic	revolution	downplayed	Persian	nationalism	and	promoted	Islamic	universalism	transcend	its	national	context	and	called	for	Muslim	unity	and	solidarity	(Buchta	2002).	The	 new	 identity	 of	 the	 Islamic	 Republic	 portrayed	 Iran	 as	 the	 vanguard	 of	revolutionary	and	anti-imperialist	Islam	and	the	legitimate	leader	of	the	Muslim	umma.	It	 thus	 explicitly	 converged	with	 the	 Saudi	worldview,	which	was	 based	 on	 solidarity	among	Muslims.	
According	 to	 Khomeini,	 Muslims	 formed	 a	 single	 community	 (umma),	 and	 the	existing	borders	were	 the	result	of	 imperialism	and	domination.	He	argued	 that	 Islam	was	 one	 and	 that	 Muslims	 should	 henceforth	 unite:	 ‘Muslims	 must	 become	 a	 single	hand.	They	must	become	a	united	hand,	remain	united,	become	one;	they	must	not	think	themselves	separate	from	us’	(quoted	in	Halliday	2002,	31).	This	claim	remained	a	core	
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concern	 for	 Iran	 and	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 new	 constitution.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Islamic	Republic	pursued	a	foreign	policy	strategy	that	appealed	to	all	Muslims.	Iran	constantly	emphasized	 its	 commitment	 to	 the	 Palestinian	 cause.	 At	 the	 height	 of	 the	 Second	Intifada	 (2000),	 Supreme	 Leader	 Khamenei	 termed	 Palestine	 ‘a	 limb	 of	 our	 body’	(Wehrey	 et	 al.	 2009,	 23).	 This	 pan-Islamist	 narrative	was	 accompanied	 by	 increasing	financial	support	to	Hamas,	the	Palestinian	Islamic	Jihad,	and	Hezbollah	in	Lebanon.	The	Iranians	thus	presented	themselves	as	the	leader	of	Islam	in	the	region	and	the	epitome	of	virtue	 in	the	Arab–Israeli	conflict,	a	narrative	similar	 to	the	one	embedded	 in	Saudi	regime	identity.		
Pan-Islamism,	appealing	to	the	idea	that	all	Muslims	form	a	group	based	on	the	ties	 of	 the	 common	 religion	 and	 are,	 therefore,	 duty-bound	 by	 fraternity	 and	brotherhood	regardless	of	creed,	colour,	ethnicity,	or	nationality,	should	have	served	as	a	common	denominator	between	the	Iranian	Republic	and	the	Kingdom	of	Saudi	Arabia.	Ironically,	 its	 implications	were	divisive.	The	Kingdom	saw	the	foundations	of	 its	state	identity	eroded.	Turki	al-Faisal	Al	Saud15	has	offered	an	 interesting	perspective	on	the	kind	of	risks	Iran	posed	to	the	Kingdom:		
Saudi	Arabia	is	the	Custodian	of	the	Two	Holy	Mosques,16	and	the	Birthplace	of	Islam,	and	as	 such	 it	 is	 the	 eminent	 leader	 of	 the	 wider	 Muslim	world.	 Iran	 portrays	 itself	 as	 the	leader	not	just	of	the	minority	Shiite	world,	but	of	all	Muslim	revolutionaries	interested	in	standing	up	to	the	West	(Al	Saud	2013,	38).	
The	distinctiveness	the	Saudi	state	claimed	to	have	in	relation	to	other	actors	was	endangered	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 pan-Islamist	 ideology	 in	 Iran.	 The	 perceived	 danger	was	magnified	by	 the	 Iranian	 revolution’s	efforts	 to	discredit	 the	Saudi	version	of	 Islam.	A	Saudi	 official	 explicated	 this	 tension	 as	 follows:	 ‘Iran’s	 biggest	 struggle	 is	 with	 Saudi	Arabia,	not	with	 the	United	States.	 Iran	wants	 to	challenge	 the	Saudi	version	of	 Islam,	that	is	the	division	of	politics	and	religion’	(quoted	in	Marschall	2003,	48).		
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This	challenge	to	Saudi	identity	distinctiveness	was	exacerbated	by	other	material	and	 domestic	 threats	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Iranian	 revolution.	 The	Shiites	 in	 the	eastern	province	of	 the	Saudi	Kingdom	staged	protests	on	28	November	1979.	The	regime	claimed	that	 its	small	Shiite	community,	estimated	at	approximately	350,000	 in	 1986,	 was	 beholden	 to	 Iranian	 influence	 (Goldberg	 1986,	 230).	 Regime	security	approaches	argue	that	these	domestic	problems	might	have	caused	the	threat	to	 the	 Saudi	 regime	 and	 led	 the	 elite	 to	 reframe	 their	 identity.	 I	 argue	 that	 domestic	dimension	 on	 its	 own	 could	 not	 pose	 an	 identity	 risk	 to	 the	 regime.	 There	 is	 no	compelling	 evidence	 that	 Iran	 was	 involved	 in	 Saudi	 internal	 affairs;	 only	 a	 small	number	of	Shiite	clerics	in	Saudi	Arabia	were	inspired	by	Khomeini’s	speeches	(Ibrahim	2006,	117).	Nevertheless,	this	community	was	small,	and	its	influence	on	the	stability	of	the	Saudi	regime	is	negligent.	From	an	ontological	security	perspective,	I	argue	that	the	domestic	dimension	became	only	relevant	as	the	narrative	of	self-identity	is	inextricably	related	to	the	interaction	with	other,	which	was	disrupted	following	the	critical	situation	created	 by	 the	 Islamic	 revolution.	 This	 domestic	 dissent	 magnified	 the	 lapses	 in	 the	regime’s	identity	narrative	and	its	ontological	insecurity.	
These	circumstances	drove	the	Saudi	rulers	to	reinvent	their	state’s	identity,	which	they	needed	to	separate	from	the	generic	pan-Islamic	rhetoric	in	order	to	re-establish	a	sense	 of	 self	 vis-à-vis	 the	 changing	 representation	 of	 the	 ‘other’—namely,	 Iran.	 The	Saudis	thus	narrowed	their	identity	to	the	Sunni	approach,	known	for	its	rejection	of	the	Shiites	 as	 a	 legitimate	 Islamic	 community.	 Sunni	 Islam	 was	 broadly	 introduced	 into	Saudi	 foreign	policy	not	as	a	source	of	 legitimacy	but	as	a	component	of	Saudi	regime	identity	distinguished	the	Kingdom	from	the	Islamic	Republic.		
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The	reduction	of	Saudi	pan-Islamic	identity	to	a	Sunni	Islamic	one	created	a	new	self-versus-other	 distinctiveness	 couched	 in	 sectarian	 terms	 (Sunni	 versus	 Shiite).	Henceforth,	the	Kingdom	adopted	an	anti-Shiite	discourse	designed	to	discredit	the	pan-Islamic	narrative	of	the	Iranian	revolution.	For	this	endeavour,	the	regime	strengthened	the	 power	 of	 the	 ‘ulama	 (as	 representatives	 of	 the	 state	 religion)	 and	 promoted	 the	Kingdom’s	 conservative	 Sunni	 image.	 It	 also	 reinforced	 a	 stricter	 Wahhabi	 code	 of	conduct,	granting	 the	 ‘ulama,	 such	as	 Ibn	Bāz,17	more	control	over	social	and	religious	life	(Steinberg	2005,	28–29).	This	was	manifested	in	the	strengthening	of	the	religious	strands	 in	 the	 educational	 system,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 state	 becoming	 closely	associated	not	only	with	Islamic	symbols	but	also	with	a	Sunni	approach	that	rejected	Shiite	symbols	(Niblock	2006,	55).	Moreover,	the	Kingdom’s	rulers	aimed	to	consolidate	the	Kingdom’s	image	as	the	eminent	leader	of	the	Muslim	world	by	using	the	title	of	‘the	custodian	of	the	two	holy	sites’—Mecca	and	Medina.	
In	 addition,	 the	 Kingdom	 explicitly	 used	 sectarian	 language	 to	 counter-frame	 and	demonize	the	Islamic	Republic.	The	Saudi	clerical	establishment	produced	an	overflow	of	 anti-Shiite	 publications	 to	 blunt	 the	 pan-Islamic	 appeal	 of	 the	 Islamic	 revolution.18	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 Sunni	 ‘ulamas,	 the	 Shiite	 propensity	 for	 saint	 worship,	shrine	 and	 grave	 cults,	 and	 veneration	 of	 imams	 were	 abhorrent	 acts	 of	 polytheism	(shirk).	 Indeed,	 Sunni	 scholars	 viewed	Shiites	 as	 ‘the	 incarnation	of	 infidelity,	 and	 (...)	polytheists’,	making	it	the	duty	of	believers	‘to	manifest	enmity	to	the	polytheists	[who]	were	 perceived	 as	 unbelievers	 (kufar),	 and	 were	 therefore	 liable	 to	 the	 severest	sanctions,	 including	 that	 of	 holy	 war	 (jihad)’	 (Goldberg	 1986,	 232).	 By	 describing	Iranians	as	defectors	(rafidda),	this	Saudi	counter-framing	of	Shi’ism	placed	the	Iranian	regime	outside	of	the	Muslim	community,		
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Based	on	this	identity	consolidation,	the	representation	of	the	‘Saudi-Sunni	self’	was	contrasted	 with	 the	 ‘Iranian-Shiite	 other’	 in	 Saudi	 foreign	 policy.	 The	 discourse	 of	exclusion,	based	on	religious	otherness	and	framed	by	a	religious	narrative,	highlighted	Saudi	 Arabia’s	 religious	 uniqueness,	 which	 was	 necessary	 to	 forge	 a	 distinct	 regime-identity	narrative.	In	other	words,	sectarianism	was	simply	a	strategy	for	re-establishing	the	Kingdom’s	distinctiveness	and,	thus,	its	ontological	security.	
B- The	Rise	of	the	Muslim	Brotherhood:	Increasing	Similarity	and	
Increasing	Insecurity	
Following	the	Islamic	revolution,	the	Kingdom	prided	itself	on	representing	Sunni	Islam	against	its	enemies	from	the	Shiite	sect.	Although	this	distinction	provided	the	Kingdom	with	a	secure	sense	of	self	for	decades,	it	was	challenged	by	the	critical	situation	created	by	the	2011	Arab	uprisings,	which	toppled	dictators	and	opened	the	doors	of	power	to	Islamist	movements.	Most	 importantly,	 the	 ascendance	 of	 the	MB	 to	 power	 in	 Egypt,	with	the	first	elected	Islamist	president	Mohamed	Morsi	was	a	key	development	at	the	regional	 level.	 The	 MB	 represented	 a	 Sunni	 approach19	very	 close	 to	 the	 Kingdom’s	Salafi-Wahhabism,	 as	 explicitly	 acknowledged	 by	 an	 old	 fatwa	 from	 the	 Permanent	Committee	for	Scholarly	Research	and	Ifta’20	in	the	Kingdom:	
The	closest	of	 all	 Islamic	groups	 to	 the	Truth	and	 the	keenest	 to	apply	 it:	Ahl-ul-Sunnah	
wal-Jama’ah	 (adherents	 to	 the	 Sunnah	 and	 the	 Muslim	 mainstreams).	 They	 are	 Ahl	Al-
Hadith	 (the	 scholars	of	Hadith),	Ansar	Al-Sunnah	group,	and	 then	Al-Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun	(the	MB).	(The	Permanent	Committee	2014)	Despite	 this	 convergence,	 I	 hypothesize	 that	 the	ascendance	of	 the	MB	 to	power	was	a	source	of	anxiety	for	the	Kingdom,	as	the	latter’s	distinct	representation	of	itself	as	the	sole	leader	of	the	Sunni	Islamic	world	was	called	into	question.	The	Saudis	saw	in	the	MB	 a	 group	with	 expansionist	 intentions	 to	 project	 its	 Sunni	 project	 in	 the	 Arab	
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world.	According	to	Saudi	officials,	the	kingdom	was	ready	to	spend	billions	to	keep	the	Muslim	 Brotherhood	 from	 coming	 to	 power	 in	 Egypt	 (Alterman	 and	 McCants	 2015,	162).	 This	 section	 examines	 the	 similarity	 between	 the	MB’s	 identity	 and	 that	 of	 the	Saudi	state,	and	how	this	similarity	created	discomfort	 for	 the	Al	Saud.	 I	subsequently	examine	how	the	Kingdom	reacted	in	order	to	re-establish	its	ontological	security.	
Although	the	ideological	foundations	of	the	MB	were	initially	different	from	those	of	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 the	 group	 underwent	 drastic	 internal	 ideological	 changes	 over	 the	decades.	It	increasingly	embraced	Salafi	ideas,	thereby	moving	into	the	same	ideological	paradigm	 as	 the	 Saudis.	 During	 the	 1970s,	 the	MB	 underwent	what	 Tammam	 (2011)	called	 ‘Salafization’,	 becoming	 a	 Salafi	 entity.	 This	 transformation	 started	 with	 the	group’s	interaction	with	the	Saudi	Kingdom	following	the	oppression	exercised	upon	it	by	 Nasser’s	 regime	 in	 the	 1950s.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 Muslim	 Brothers	 who	 fled	 the	country	 found	 refuge	 in	 Saudi	Arabia,	where	 they	were	 actively	 engaged	 in	 the	 social	and	economic	modernization	of	 the	Kingdom,	under	 the	 reign	of	King	Faisal.	Through	protracted	 exposure	 to	 the	 Saudi	 environment,	 the	 members	 of	 the	 group	 gradually	embraced	 Wahhabi	 ideas,	 which	 became	 integral	 to	 the	 group’s	 ideology	 (Tammam	2008).	When	the	MB	reconvened	its	activity	in	Egypt	in	the	1970s,	the	ideological	fusion	between	 the	 Brotherhood’s	 initial	 approach	 and	 Salafism	 was	 apparent.	 The	 Salafi–Brotherhood	intermarriage	manifested	in	the	group’s	intolerance	toward	other	Islamic	and	non-Islamic	groups,	such	as	the	Copts	(Tadros	2012,	chap.	5).	This	trend	was	also	manifested	 in	 the	 perceived	 necessity	 of	 applying	 shari’a.	 These	 positions	 clearly	demonstrated	that	the	Salafi	discourse	was	becoming	the	dominant	ideology	within	the	group.	 Moreover,	 many	 Brotherhood	 sheikhs	 adopted	 the	 Salafi	 clothing	 and	temperament,	and	a	generation	of	‘salafized’	preachers	emerged	within	the	group.21	
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These	changes	in	the	Brotherhood’s	approach	made	the	group	ideologically	more	convergent	with	the	Saudi	interpretation	of	Islam.	The	MB’s	ideology	became	even	more	concrete	with	 the	 group’s	 rise	 following	Mubarak’s	 downfall	 in	 February	 2011.	 Salafi	Islamic	 values	 provided	 the	 source	 of	 identity	 in	 Brotherhood-led	 Egypt.	 During	 his	electoral	campaign,	Mohamed	Morsi	emphasized	the	group’s	adherence	to	Salafism:	
The	Koran	is	our	constitution,	the	Prophet	Muhammad	is	our	leader,	jihad	is	our	path,	and	death	for	the	sake	of	Allah	is	our	most	 lofty	aspiration	 ...	shari‘a,	shari‘a,	and	then	finally	shari‘a.	This	nation	will	enjoy	blessing	and	revival	only	through	the	Islamic	shari‘a.	(Morsi	2012)	If	 the	 Kingdom	 claimed	 to	 represent	 the	 Sunni	 Islamic	 world,	 with	 a	 King	portraying	 himself	 as	 the	 protector	 of	 the	 holy	 mosques	 of	 Mecca	 and	 Medina,	 an	Islamist-led	Egypt	undermined	the	main	credentials	of	the	Saudi	identity.	The	Kingdom	was	no	longer	the	sole	Sunni	model	in	the	region	(Al-Rasheed	2013).	In	other	words,	the	very	existence	of	 the	Saudi	 state	was	at	 stake	as	 its	distinctiveness	vis-à-vis	 the	other	was	 eroded.	 Since	 ontological	 security	 is	 the	 security	 of	 being,	 actors	 can	 feel	uncomfortable	if	their	relations	with	others	are	disrupted.	With	the	rise	of	the	MB,	the	uniqueness	of	 the	Saudi	 identity	 as	 the	 leader	of	 Sunni	world	was	disrupted.	 In	other	words,	the	Kingdom	found	itself	in	a	new,	critical	situation	that	generated	insecurity.	
The	rise	of	the	MB	not	only	eroded	the	distinctiveness	of	the	Kingdom’s	identity	at	the	 regional	 level,	 but	 it	 also	 became	 a	 potential	 threat	 at	 the	 domestic	 level	 as	 it	inspired	 contentious	 voices	within	 the	Kingdom.	 It	 led	 to	 discussions	 that	 questioned	Saudi	religious	theory	–	the	foundation	of	the	Kingdom’s	identity.	Dissenters	questioned	the	contradictions	within	this	theory,	especially	regarding	the	political	aspects,	such	as	individual	 constitutional	 rights.22	These	 debates	 were	 initiated	 most	 explicitly	 by	 the	leaders	of	the	al-Sahwa	al-Islamiyya	movement	(the	Islamic	Awakening),23	a	group	that	had	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 legitimizing	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 Al	 Saud,	 especially	 those	
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against	al-Qaeda,	in	the	first	decade	of	the	century.	It	is	worth	nothing	that	these	critics	did	not	question	the	legitimacy	of	Al	Saud.24	In	contrast,	they	appealed	to	the	ability	of	the	ruling	 family,	and	only	 the	ruling	 family,	 to	 initiate	 reforms.	 In	other	words,	 these	discussions	 did	 not	 endanger	 the	 physical	 security	 of	 the	 regime,	 but	 rather	 its	existential	ontological	security.	
From	 an	 ontological	 security	 perspective,	 we	 would	 expect	 the	 Kingdom	 to	respond	 by	 asserting	 its	 distinctiveness.	 Whereas	 the	 Kingdom	 had	 reinvented	 its	identity	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Islamic	 revolution	 in	 Iran	 by	 narrowing	 its	 Islamic	 identity	 to	 a	purely	 Sunni	 version,	 re-establishing	 identity	 security	 in	 2012	was	more	 challenging.	While	forging	this	new	distinction	by	narrowing	its	own	identity	narrative,	the	Kingdom	went	on	discrediting	the	MB	or	the	new	‘other’.	It	used	several	mechanisms	to	do	so.	
First,	 the	 Kingdom	 sought	 to	 discredit	 the	 viability	 of	 the	MB	 as	 a	 ‘true’	 Salafi	group.	 The	 Saudi	 religious	 establishment	 denied	 the	 Salafi	 nature	 of	 the	 group,	especially	 in	 the	 regime-influenced	 media	 outlets.	 In	 a	 local	 newspaper,	 Al-Madina,	leading	Saudi	sheikhs	pronounced	fatwas	claiming	that	the	MB	had	‘no	Salafi	roots’.	 In	response	to	the	question	of	whether	the	MB	belonged	to	the	72	groups	in	Islam	that	had	gone	 astray,	 Sheikh	 Salih	 bin-Fawzan	 al-Fawzan,	 a	 senior	 member	 of	 the	 Ifta’	Committee,	stated,	‘yes,	everyone	who	violates	ahl-Sunna	wa	al-Jama’a	in	Islam	in	da’wa	or	doctrine	or	any	of	the	faith	pillars	belongs	to	the	72	groups’.	Sheikh	Muhammed	bin	al-Laydan,	a	member	of	the	Council	of	Senior	Scholars,	claimed,	‘the	Brotherhood	…	are	not	from	the	truthful	Islamic	schools	of	thought	and	its	name	has	no	origin	in	the	Salaf	predecessors’	(Al-Sayali	2013).	
	 Second,	 the	Kingdom	portrayed	 itself	as	 the	guardian	of	 ‘truthful’	 Islam	against	the	 MB,	 which	 was	 accused	 of	 ‘pragmatism’	 and,	 thus	 faithless.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
27		
Kingdom	accused	the	MB	to	manipulate	religious	texts	to	justify	policies	that	only	serve	the	 group’s	 interests.	 Moreover,	 the	 MB	 was	 accused	 of	 shifting	 allies,	 which	 were	driven	 by	 material	 interests,	 regardless	 of	 their	 compliance	 to	 their	 Islamic	 identity.	During	 Morsi’s	 rise	 to	 power	 and	 until	 he	 was	 removed	 from	 power,	 the	 regime-influenced	media	portrayed	the	MB	as	‘unfaithful’	and	accused	it	of	using	religion	as	an	instrument.	This	portrayal	was	often	exemplified	by	the	long	history	of	the	group	and	its	relationship	to	the	Al	Saud.	The	MB	was	depicted	as	an	unfaithful	organization	that	did	not	 acknowledge	 the	 help	 and	 the	 support	 provided	 to	 it	 by	 the	 Al	 Saud	 (Al-Utaybi	2011).25	In	 this	 vein,	 the	 Saudi	 Minister	 of	 Islamic	 Affairs,	 Endowment,	 Da’wa,	 and	Guidance,	Salih	bin	Abdul-Aziz	Al-Sheikh,	stated	that	the	MB	was	known	for	‘hypocrisy’,	as	 its	 behaviour	 was	 driven	 by	 interests	 instead	 of	 ‘faith’.	 This	 narrative	 was	 best	exemplified	in	the	series	of	six	articles	published	by	Al-Sharq	Al-Awsat	and	entitled	‘The	Brotherhood	and	Saudi	Arabia:	The	Entire	Story’.	These	articles	described	the	group	as	treacherous	and	unfaithful	(Anonymous	2014).	
Third,	the	Kingdom	distinguished	itself	as	the	leader	of	‘moderate’	Sunni	Islam,	in	contrast	 to	 the	 supposed	 ‘radical	 and	 fundamental’	 nature	 of	 the	MB.	When	 the	 new	regime	 in	 Egypt	 massacred	 Brotherhood	 protestors	 in	 August	 2013,	 King	 Abdullah	uncharacteristically	voiced	his	public	support	for	the	military	intervention:		
Let	 the	 entire	 world	 know	 that	 the	 people	 and	 government	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 Saudi	Arabia	 stood	 and	 still	 stand	 today	 with	 our	 brothers	 in	 Egypt	 against	 terrorism,	extremism	and	sedition,	and	against	whomever	is	trying	to	interfere	in	Egypt's	internal	affairs.	(King	Abdullah	Al	Saud	2013)	When	 the	 new	 Egyptian	 government	 declared	 the	 MB	 a	 terrorist	 organization	 in	December	2013,	Saudi	Arabia	followed	suit.	On	7	March	2014,	a	Saudi	Interior	Ministry	statement	 pronounced	 the	MB,	 along	with	 other	 groups,	 including	 al-Qaeda	 in	 Yemen	
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and	Iraq,	a	terrorist	group	(BBC	2014).	Since	then,	the	regime	narrative	has	portrayed	the	MB	as	intrinsically	violent.		
	 In	a	word,	in	order	to	restore	its	identity	security,	the	Kingdom	aimed	to	forge	a	new,	 distinctive	 identity	 narrative,	 not	 only	 as	 the	 sole	 leader	 of	 Sunni	 Islam	 in	 the	region,	 but	 also	 as	 the	 upholder	 of	 a	 strict	 Salafi-Wahhabi	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	(Commins	 2015,	 164–165).	 It	 also	 portrayed	 the	 MB	 as	 unfaithful,	 treacherous,	 and	radical.	In	this	way,	the	Saudi	royal	elite	was	able	to	maintain	a	seemingly	coherent	and	distinct	identity,	and	was	thus	able	to	restore	its	identity	security.	
	
CONCLUSION	
Similarities	 in	 identity	 can	 both	 unite	 and	 divide.	 In	 this	 article,	 I	 have	 developed	 a	theoretical	 framework	 to	explain	how,	and	why,	 similarity	 can	cause	 cleavages.	 In	 the	case	of	Saudi	foreign	policy,	I	have	found	that	similarity	became	particularly	threatening	as	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 Saudi	 identity	was	 challenged.	 The	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	Kingdom	was	based	on	two	exclusive	identity	narratives,	which	portrayed	Saudi	Arabia,	first,	 as	 the	 sole	 and	 legitimate	 leader	of	 Islam,	until	 1979,	 and	 then,	 subsequently,	 of	Sunni	Islam,	until	2012.		By	showing	how	these	critical	situations	led	to	the	reframing	of	Saudi	 identity	 narratives,	 this	 article	 probed	 and	 confirmed	 the	 plausibility	 of	 an	ontological	 security	 explanation	 of	 Saudi	 foreign	 policy.	 In	 addition,	 Saudi	 identity	reframing	 through	 demonization	 and	 narrowing	 highlights	 anxiety	 as	 a	 driving	 cause	behind	 Saudi	 behaviour.	 The	 theoretical	 framework	 showed	 that	 this	 under-explored	concept	of	‘anxiety’	as	a	drive	of	ontological	insecurity	deserves	further	inquiry.	Despite	its	 development	 as	 an	 individual	 feeling	 in	 Giddens’	 structuration	 theory,	 future	research	would	explore	how	collective	actors,	such	as	states,	suffer	anxiety.	
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Ontological	 security	 approaches	provide	 a	novel	 theoretical	 entry	point	 for	 the	study	of	Middle	Eastern	countries’	foreign	policy.	They	supplement	realist	assumptions	about	 regimes’	 physical	 security	with	 the	 consideration	 of	 ontological	 security	 needs,	which	can	explain	how	the	emergence	of	a	similar	identity	can	cause	a	state	anxiety.	The	framework	 developed	 here	 may	 shed	 additional	 light	 on	 recent	 developments	 in	 the	region—for	example,	Saudi	fears	resulting	from	the	establishment	of	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	 and	 Syria	 (ISIS)	 (cf.	 Dorsey	 2014).	 Also,	 an	 ontological	 security	 approach	 shows	that	 the	 seemingly	 sectarian	 divisions	 of	 the	 region	 can	 be	 understood	 differently.	Predominantly	 sectarian	 explanations	 consider	 identity	 difference	 to	 be	 the	 driving	force	 behind	 conflict.	 Ontological	 security	 approaches	 suggest	 a	 different	 starting	point—that	is,	that	states	have	a	stake	in	maintaining	these	sectarian	divisions	to	fulfil	ontological	 security	 needs.	 By	 demonstrating	 ontological	 security’s	 usefulness	 in	explaining	rare	moments	in	history,	this	paper	yields	implications	beyond	the	context	of	the	 Middle	 East.	 Ontological	 security	 approaches	 might	 also	 illuminate	 cases	 where	revolutions	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	 democratic	waves	 threaten	 the	 existential	 security	 of	authoritarian	regimes	(cf.	Gunitsky	2014).	
Ultimately,	 this	 argument	makes	 important	 contributions	 to	 IR	 theory	 and	 the	ontological	security	literature	in	particular.	While	there	is	some	recognition	that	identity	similarity	 drives	 cooperation,	 this	 examination	 of	 the	 Saudi	 case	 has	 probed	 the	plausibility	that	identity	similarity	can	be	a	source	of	conflict,	a	proposition	that	invites	theory	building	and	testing	to	confirm	such	a	hypothesis.	The	discussion	on	how	identity	is	 framed	 and	 reframed	 has	 also	 contributed	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 sources	 of	ontological	 security.	 In	 line	 with	 Zakarol	 (2010),	 the	 contention	 among	 scholars	 of	ontological	security	on	the	sources	of	 identity,	whether	endogenous	or	exogenous,	 the	case	of	Saudi	Arabia	demonstrates	 that	both	approaches	are	present	 in	 the	process	of	
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state	identity	reframing	and	its	related	sense	of	security.	States	reframe	their	identity	in	the	 process	 of	 interaction	 with	 others	 but	 also	 according	 to	 their	 reflexive	understanding	of	the	Self.		
In	 its	 quest	 for	 distinctiveness,	 the	 Kingdom	 has	 constantly	 highlighted	 its	differences	 vis-à-vis	 the	 other,	 reducing	 its	 identity	 narrative	 from	 pan-Islamism	 to	Sunni	 Islam	 and	 then	 to	 Salafi-Wahhabism	 as	 a	 result.	 Future	 research	 should,	henceforth,	examine	how	differences	are	framed	and	how	states	choose	among	various	sources	 of	 distinctiveness.	 As	 Bateson	 (1979,	 98)	 has	 said,	 ‘the	 number	 of	 potential	differences	 (...)	 is	 infinite	 but	 very	 few	 become	 effective	 differences	 (...)	 that	 make	 a	difference’.	
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